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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments entered by 
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the panel majority of the Utah Court of Appeals erred in holding that the time 
under the Utah Municipal Code ("UMC") for filing a petition for review of a municipal 
appeal board order runs from the date appearing on the order, as opposed to from the date the 
municipal recorder certifies the order as final. 
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, [the Supreme Court] review[s] the decision of the 
court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law." State ex rel 
T.R, 2011 UT 51,1[16, 266 P.3d 739. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 is of central importance to this appeal; its full text 
appears in the addendum as Addendum "D."1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
On November 12, 2009, South Jordan City terminated the employment of officer, 
Brett Perez, who had worked for fourteen years as a South Jordan Police Department police 
!The Utah legislature materially amended section 10-3-1106 effective May 8, 2012. 
In this brief, Perez refers to and analyzes the version of section 10-3-1106 in effect at the 
time he filed his July 9, 2010 appeal. 
1 
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officer. R. at 1-3, 53 (Tr. 2:25-3:1). The City based its termination on an incident that 
occurred on May 28,2009, as well as prior disciplinary actions against Perez already on file. 
R. at 1 -3. Perez appealed the termination to the South Jordan City Appeal Board under Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The South Jordan City Appeal Board conducted a hearing regarding Perez's 
termination on May 26,2010. Id, at 13-14,53. The Appeal Board upheld the City's decision 
to terminate Perez's employment in a ruling entitled "Decision and Order" ("Order") and 
bearing the date June 7,2010. R. at 52. The City's recorder, Anna West, certified the Order 
as final on June 10,2010 and mailed notice of its certification to Perez on the same date. See 
Addendum "C." Perez filed a petition for review with the Utah Court of Appeals on July 9, 
2010 under Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1106 and 78A-4-103(2)(a). In a split decision, the Utah 
Court of Appeals dismissed Perez's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The majority reasoned 
i 
that Perez's appeal was untimely because he filed it more than 30 days after the date 
appearing on the Order. Judge Orme dissented, reasoning that Perez's appeal was timely 
because he filed it within 30 days of the date the city recorder certified the Order as final. < 
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision from which Perez appeals is reported as Perez 
v. South Jordan City, 2011 UT App 430, 268 P.3d 87, case no. 20100545, decided on 
\ 
December 15, 2011. A copy of that decision is attached as Addendum "A." The Appeal 
Board Order dated June 7, 2010 is attached as Addendum "B." 
< 
2 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Perez's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 
the pertinent facts are those relating to the timing of Perez's appeal. 
Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Perez's termination, the Appeal 
Board members signed the Order. The words "Dated this 7th day of June, 2010" appear above 
the block containing the Appeal Board members' signatures. See Addendum "B." The Order 
lacks any indication it is "final" or "official." Id. Similarly, the Order does not contain the 
word "issued" (or any variation thereof), nor does it reflect a date of "issuance." Id. The last 
paragraph of the Order states: "The board requests the City Recorder certify this decision in 
accordance with the South Jordan City Employee Handbook." Id. 
Although the Appeal Board appears to have signed the Order on June 7, 2010, it did 
not immediately deliver the Order to Anna West, the South Jordan City Recorder, for 
certification. Rather, it waited until June 10,2010 to do so. See Addendum "C" (indicating 
the Appeal Board delivered the Order to Ms. West's office on June 10, 2010). In turn, Ms. 
West mailed the Order and a cover letter to the parties' counsel on that same day. See id. Ms. 
West's letter stated, in pertinent part: 
Enclosed is a copy of the official Certified Decision & Order of the 
Employee Appeals Board Hearing held May 26,2010 for Brett Perez v. 
South Jordan City that was delivered to my office today, June 10,2010. 
Section 4-06(5)e(4) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states, 
'any final action or order oj the board may be appealed by either the 
employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing with that 
3 
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court a notice oj appeal no later than 30 days from the date of the 
issuance of the final action or order of the boards 
See id. (emphasis in original). Ms. West's letter was the first document to describe the Order 
as "official" and "[certified." See id. Perez filed his petition for review on July 9, 2010 -
29 days from the date Ms. West certified the Order as final and mailed it to the parties, but 32 
days from the date the Appeal Board signed the Order. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Unlike other administrative schemes, the UMC contains a unique "certification" step. 
Once a municipal appeal board has decided a matter, it must tender its decision to the 
municipal recorder, which certifies the decision. The UMC then allows a party to appeal 
"final" appeal board orders that have "issued." Unfortunately, the UMC does not define 
either "final" or "issued." 
With this background, Perez advances three arguments in this petition. First, Perez 
argues a municipal recorder's certification of an appeal board order makes that order "final" 
for appeal purposes under the UMC. Until certification has occurred, Perez asserts, the order 
is subject to modification and therefore not appealable. Further, the municipal recorder serves 
as an intermediary between the employee and the appeal board in virtually every step of the 
appeal process. Thus, Perez's argument gives effect to the legislatively-mandated role of the 
municipal recorder in the appeal process, while the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation in 1 
Perez does not. 
i 
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Second, Perez argues that certification by a municipal recorder is what constitutes 
"issuance" of an appeal board order under the UMC. Certification by a municipal recorder 
is analogous to a court clerk's entry of a court order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b)-(c). 
This interpretation of the UMC again gives effect to the legislature's choice to require a 
municipal recorder's involvement in the certification process. The Utah Court of Appeals' 
application of court decisions interpreting Utah's Administrative Procedures Act-which does 
not contain a certification process - renders the UMC's certification process superfluous. 
Finally, Perez argues that his proposed interpretation of the UMC's certification 
process advances Utah public policy that favors certainty, consistency, predictability, and 
uniformity, especially for municipal employees who have a constitutional right to their 
employment. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-3-1106 REQUIRES A MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE DESIRING 
TO APPEAL AN APPEAL BOARD ORDER TO FILE THAT APPEAL 
WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE APPEARING ON THE ORDER, AS 
OPPOSED TO WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE THE CITY RECORDER 
CERTIFIES THE ORDER. 
This Court should rule that the time for Perez to appeal the Order commenced on June 
10, 2010, the date Ms. West certified the Order as final. Accordingly, this Court should 
reverse the Court of Appeal's decision that Perez's July 9, 2010 appeal was untimely. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 allows a municipal employee to appeal his or her 
termination of employment to a municipal appeal board. Id. at § 10-3-1106(2)(a). After an 
evidentiary hearing, the appeal board must decide the matter by secret ballot. Id. at § 10-3-
1106(5)(a)(i). The decision must then be certified to the municipality's recorder. Id. If an 
employee wishes to appeal the decision, he or she must file a petition for review with the Utah 
Court of Appeals "within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or order of the appeal 
board." Id. at § 10-3-1106(6)(b). 
The critical terms in subsection 10-3-1106(6)(b) and to this appeal are "issuance" and 
"final." By the plain text of the statute, a municipal employee may only appeal an appeal 
board order that is both "issue[d]" and "final." See id. Unfortunately, the UMC does not 
define either term. 1 
Perez submits that an appeal board order becomes "final" when it is certified by a 
municipal recorder. Perez also submits that certification of an order by a municipal recorder 
i 
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constitutes "issuance" of that order under the statute. As will be shown below, Perez's 
arguments are faithful to the plain text of the UMC, the City's policies, Utah case law, and 
sound policy considerations. 
A. A Municipal Recorder's Certification of an Appeal Board Order Converts 
the Order into a "Final" Order Appealable under Utah Code Ann, § 10-3-
1106 and South Jordan City Policy, 
This Court should rule that a municipal recorder's certification of an appeal board 
order renders that order "final" under § 10-3-1106(6)(a) and South Jordan City policy. 
A municipal employee may only appeal "[a] final action or order of the appeal 
board[,]" provided the employee does so "within 30 days after the issuance of the final action 
or order of the appeal board." See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-1106(6)(a) & (b). But what 
causes an appeal board order to become "final" and therefore appealable? The UMC, City 
policy, and Ms. West's June 10 communication answer that a municipal recorder's 
certification is the act that renders an appeal board order "final." 
Both the UMC and City policy plainly require certification of an appeal board's order 
by a municipal recorder. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) ("Each decision of the appeal 
board . . . shall be certified to the recorder ") (emphasis added); South Jordan Employee 
Handbook, § 4-06(5)(e)(2) ("Each decision of the Appeals Board shallbe certified to the City 
Recorder . . . . ) " (emphasis added). Because certification is both a mandatory and discrete 
component of the statutory appeal process, the legislature must have intended it to serve an 
important purpose. 
7 
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Furthermore, until an appeal board order has been certified, that order is subject to 
change or modification by the appeal board. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 (nowhere 
prohibiting a municipal appeal board from modifying an action or order prior to certification 
to the municipal recorder). Perhaps the Appeal Board in this case was contemplating revision 
and thus held onto the Order for three days2 before tendering it to Ms. West. In any event, an 
order that is subject to change is not appealable. On the other hand, once an order has been 
certified by the municipal recorder, there is no practical way for the appeal board to modify 
it. Therefore, Perez submits that certification must be the act that converts an appeal board 
order into a "final" appealable one. 
Both the Order and the June 10, 2010 letter from Anna West support this conclusion. 
The Order reads in pertinent part: 
The Board hereby affirms the decision of Chief Shepherd to terminate 
OfficerPerez' employment with South Jordan City. The Board requests 
the City Recorder certify this decision in accordance with the South 
Jordan City Employee Handbook. 
See Addendum "B" at 18 (emphasis added). Thus, as of June 7, 2010, certification had not 
occurred. Id. Contrast this with Ms. West's letter, which reads in relevant part: 
Enclosed is a copy of the official Certified Decision & Order of the 
Employee Appeals Board Hearing held May 26,2010 for Brett Perez v. 
South Jordan City that was delivered to my office today, June 10,2010. 
2June 7,2010 was a Monday. Thus, the three-day interim between the Appeal Board's 
June 7, 2010 dating of the Order and June 10, 2010 delivery of the same to Ms. West for 
certification was not due to an intervening weekend. i 
8 
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Section 4-06(5)(e)(4) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states, 
'any final action or order oj the board may be appealed by either the 
employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing with that 
court a notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date of the 
issuance of the final action or order of the board.' 
See Addendum "C" (boldface italics added; italics in original). In other words, certification 
had occurred as of June 10. 
By juxtaposing information about the "official'' and "[certified" character of the Order 
with information on how to appeal "any final action or order of the board[,]" Ms. West's letter 
suggests that, as of June 10, the Order was "final" for purposes of appeal. See id. Put another 
way, Ms. West's letter communicated that her certification of the Order changed its character 
in a meaningful way to Perez. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should rule that Ms. West's June 10, 2010 
certification of the Order converted it into a "final" appealable order under the UMC. 
B. A Municipal Recorder's Certification of a Final Appeal Board Order 
Constitutes "Issuance" of that Order under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106. 
The Court of Appeals held the Order was "issued" on June 7, 2010, the date that 
appears on the last page of the Order, and that Perez's appeal 32 days later was untimely. See 
Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at ^8. This Court should reverse and rule that the Order was 
"issued" on June 10, 2010, the date Ms. West certified the Order as final. 
Both the UMC and South Jordan City Policy required Perez to file his appeal within 
30 days of the "issuance" of the Appeal Board's "final" Order. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-3-1106(6)(b); South Jordan Employee Handbook § 4-06(5)(e)(4). Unfortunately, neither 
9 
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the Utah Code nor City policy explains what constitutes "issuance." Furthermore, the Order 
itself is largely unhelpful. Although above the signature block are the words "Dated this 7th 
day of June, 2010," the Order does not contain any variation of the word "issued" or otherwise 
identify a date of "issuance." See Addendum "B." 
Section 10-3-1106fs scheme, however, supports Perez's argument that certification of 
an order by a municipal recorder constitutes "issuance" of that order. Under the UMC, a 
municipal employee commences an appeal of discipline by filing a written appeal to the 
municipal recorder.3 See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(3)(a) ("Each appeal under Subsection 
(2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the municipal recorder within 
10 days after . . . the discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.") (emphasis added). 
Upon receiving an employee's appeal, the municipal recorder must refer the appeal to 
the municipal appeal board. Id at § 10-3-1106(3)(b)(i) ("Upon filing of an appeal under 
Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the 
appeal board."). And after hearing and deciding the matter, the appeal board is required to 
certify its decision to the municipal recorder. See id. at §§ 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) & (5)(a)(i). 
Save for the evidentiary hearing itself, there is no statutory mechanism for direct 
communication between an appealing employee and a municipal appeal board. Indeed, the 
3South Jordan policy contains a similar requirement. See South Jordan Employee 
Handbook § 4-06(5)(a) ("Appeals to the Appeal Board shall be taken by filing written notice 
of the appeal with the City Recorder within ten days of receipt of the notice of the imposition 
of the suspension . . . , demotion or involuntary transfer... or termination . . ..") (emphasis 
added). 
10 
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Utah legislature chose to position a municipal recorder as a required intermediary in virtually 
every step of the appeal process.4 It follows, then, that the municipal recorder's certification 
of an appeal board order is the final communication that not only ends the appeal board 
appeals process but also triggers the next appeals process.5 In other words, the certification 
step constitutes "issuance" of an appealable order under § 10-3-1106(6)(b), triggering the 
employee's right to appeal to the court of appeals within 3 0 days. See id. Perez's July 9,2010 
appeal would have been timely under this approach. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held the June 7,2010 date on the Order was the "issuance" 
date of the Order, and that Perez's July 9, 2010 appeal was thus untimely. Perez, 2011 UT 
App 430, at f4. In so holding, the Court of Appeals relied upon this Court's decisions 
interpreting the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,6 ultimately concluding "We see no 
reason to interpret the Utah Municipal Code any differently." Id.7 
4In South Jordan, the city recorder even "records and takes minutes of each [appeal 
board hearing] session, except for the Appeal Board's deliberations." South Jordan 
Employee Handbook § 4-06(5)(d)(3). 
Essentially, Perez argues municipal recorders in UMC appeals serve a similar role 
as clerks in the judicial system. Both handle filing of the parties' papers, communications 
between the parties and the tribunal, and entry of final actions, orders, and judgments. 
including this Court's pronouncement "that the date the order constituting the final 
agency action issues is the date the order bears on its face." See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, 
at | 4 (citing Dusty % Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per 
curiam) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989)). 
7The Court of Appeals also relied upon Silva v. Dept. of Employment Sec., 786 P.2d 
246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), for its rule that filing deadlines should be measured by the date 
a decision is issued rather than the date it is mailed. See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at f4. 
11 
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This Court should reject the Court of Appeals' holding for several reasons. First, there 
is "a reason to interpret the [UMC] differently than the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA). The UAPA does not include a provision like the UMC provision that imposes a 
certification step." See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at [^10 (Orme, J., dissenting); Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63G-4-301-302 & -401 (none mandating a certification process). Certification was 
obviously important to the legislature, yet the Court of Appeals' ruling renders it superfluous. 
The Court of Appeals' ruling thus runs afoul of several cardinal rules of statutory 
interpretation. 
[W]e are compelled to give the statutory language meaning and to 
assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly. Thus, we 
construe statutory enactments in a way that renders all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful. We also avoid an interpretation which renders 
portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative . . . . 
See Andreason v. Felsted, 2006 UT App 188, [^18, 137 P.3d 1 ( (internal quotations and 
citations omitted); HaroldSelman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 2011 UT 18, ^ fl8,251 P.3d 804 
(the Supreme Court stating the "primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature.") (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Second, this Court should, as Judge Orme suggests, view the "UMC' s requirement that < 
the [appeal board's] decision be certified to the City Recorder [as] analogous to the 
requirement that judgments be filed with the court clerk before they become final and 
i 
appealable." See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at ^ f 10 (Orme, J., dissenting) (citing Utah R. Civ. 
P. 58A(b)-(c) for its explanation that a "judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered 
( 
12 
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for all purposes . . . when it is signed [by the judge] and filed [with the clerk") (emphasis 
added). Unlike the ruling mPerez, Judge Orme's view gives effect to the legislature's choice 
to include the recorder as a key intermediary between appeal boards and municipal employees. 
Third, the Court of Appeals improperly relied upon Silva. In that case, the appellant 
had until October 25 to appeal an Industrial Commission Board of Review decision. The 
appellant mailed his notice of appeal on October 23 but the court did not receive it until 
October 26. 786 P.2d at 246. Silva argued his 30-day appeal deadline should be extended 
because he received the Industrial Commission's decision in the mail days after it had been 
decided. Id. at 247.8 The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating "[t]he appeal time 
commences when the final agency order issues and not when allegedly received by a party. 
Nor can the thirty-day time be extended three days because the agency mailed a copy to the 
petitioner." Id. 
Silva has no application to this matter. Perez has never argued, nor does he argue here, 
that Ms. West's mailing of the Order to him should extend his appeal time. Additionally, 
Silva provides zero guidance on what constitutes the "issuance" of a final appeal board order 
under the UMC. The Silva court, like the Court of Appeals in Perez, relied on UAPA for its 
"issuance" determination. See 786 P.2d at 247 (referencing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
8Silva also argued his appeal was timely because it should be deemed filed on the date 
he mailed it, not the date the court received it. Silva, 786 P.2d at 247. The Court of Appeals 
rejected this argument, stating "[t]he argument that an appeal is filed when mailed has been 
consistently rejected in the pas t . . . . " Id. However, this aspect of Silva is unhelpful to the 
instant matter because Perez did not mail his petition for review. 
13 
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14(3)(a)).9 UAPA does not contain the UMC's certification requirement, so Silva does not, 
by itself, support the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Perez's appeal as untimely. 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should rule that a municipal recorder's certification 
of an appeal board order constitutes "issuance" of that order and triggers a petitioner's appeal 
right under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b) on the certification date. Accordingly, this 
Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that Perez's July 9, 2010 appeal was 
untimely, as he filed it within 30 days of Ms. West's June 10 certification of the Order. 
IL THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION 
IN PEREZ TO PROMOTE CERTAINTY AND UNIFORMITY RESPECTING 
APPEAL RIGHTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1106. 
Sound policy dictates that a petitioner filing an appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106(6) should be readily able to ascertain when his or her appeal opportunity commences and 
ends. See Silva, 786 P.2d at 247 (the Utah Court of Appeals rejecting a rule that "would 
render uncertain the time for appeal "). Indeed, promoting certainty in appeal rights and 
deadlines is particularly important for persons who have a constitutional right in their 
employment, as municipal employees do.10 
Utah public policy supports rules that promote consistency, uniformity, and
 { 
predictability. See Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 
9Which is now codified at §63G-4-401. 1 
10Police officers have a recognized property right in their employment, and, like other 
municipal employees, are entitled to adequate due process in connection with the suspension 
or termination of their employment. Becker v. Sunset City, 2009 UT App 197, f 6, 216 P.3d 
367. * 
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UT 97, ^ |8, 175 P.3d 1036 (this Court identifying consistency, predictability, and uniformity 
as important public policies); Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 2006 UT 16, f 18, 133 P.3d 
382 (same). It follows that public policy would support uniform treatment of similarly-
situated appellants. One appellant seeking review under a discrete statute should be afforded 
the same rights as all other appellants appealing under that statute. 
The Perez decision contravenes the above policies in at least two ways. First, the 
Court of Appeals' holding that the time for appeal begins to run on the date reflected on an 
appeal board order will likely result in great uncertainty for future appellants. Judge Orme 
provided some examples in his dissent: 
It may be that my view11 actually promotes greater certainty [than 
the majority's view]. In this case, there was a blank for the day in June 
when the order was signed. Someone - one of the three signatories, 
presumably - penned in "7." It is admittedly a legible, distinct seven in 
this case. But what if it looked like it could be a one or a seven? Or 
what if the signatories neglected to fill In the blank? Or what if the copy 
mailed to Perez bore one hand-written date and the copy in the Board's 
file bore a different one? The uncertainty resulting from such ambiguity 
would be eliminated by reliance on the more straightforward 
certification date. 
Id. at TJ12 n.2 (Orme, J., dissenting). This Court should favor Judge Orme's view, which 
Perez adopts in this petition, over the Court of Appeals's ruling that allows ambiguities to 
render uncertain municipal appellants' appeal rights. 
u
"[T]hat issuance [under Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b)] equates to the date a 
signed order is certified " See Perez, 2011 UT App 430, ^12 (Orme, J., dissenting). 
15 
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Second, the Court of Appeals' decision has narrow application and is unhelpful to any 
situation involving a decision-to-certification delay of more than three or less than 15 days. 
Future petitioners in Perez's shoes would have to litigate any delay more than three days and 
future courts would have to find some way of determining whether a nine-day delay, for 
example, is more prejudicial than a three-day delay, and why. 
Perez's proposed rule - that the time to appeal an appeal board's order under Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) begins to run upon the municipal recorder's certification of that 
order - would eliminate the Court of Appeals's concern "that a lengthy delay [between 
execution and certification] could conceivably result in the violation of a petitioner's statutory 
right to seek judicial review " Perez, 2011 UT App 430, at [^6. Therefore, based on the 
foregoing, this Court should rule that Perez's proposed certification-constitutes-"issuance" 
rule promotes greater certainty and uniformity than the Court of Appeals' date of order-
constitutes-"issuance" rule. This Court should adopt Perez's proposed rule accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should rule that a municipal recorder's certification both renders an appeal 
board order "final" and constitutes "issuance" of that order under § 10-3-1106(6), thereby 
triggering that section's 30-day appeal right. Accordingly, Perez respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Perez's appeal and remand the matter for 
further consideration. 
16 
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DATED this J_\_ day of May 2012. 
KESLER&RUST 
Brett Perez 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Brett PEREZ, Petitioner, 
v. 
SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a Utah municipal corpor-
ation; and South Jordan City Appeal Board, Re-
spondents. 
No. 20100545-CA. 
Dec. 15,2011. 
Background: Employee sought review of decision 
of city appeal board upholding termination of his 
employment by city. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Davis, P.J., held 
that decision became final when order was issued, 
rather than when decision was certified to the city 
recorder. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Municipal Corporations 268 €=>218(9) 
268 Municipal Corporations 
268V Officers, Agents, and Employees 
268V(C) Agents and Employees 
268k218 Removal, Discharge, Transfer or 
Demotion 
268k218(9) k. Review. Most Cited 
Cases 
Decision of city appeal board upholding the 
termination of employee's employment by city be-
came final for purposes of judicial review on the 
date appeal board issued its order, rather than when 
decision was certified to the city recorder; the certi-
fication of the order to the city recorder was merely 
a step in the process of notifying the employee of 
the board's decision, it did nothing to delay the date 
of issuance, mailing of the decision within three 
days of its issuance was sufficiently prompt and did 
not result in a violation of employee's statutory 
right to seek judicial review of the decision, and 
mailed notice expressly notified employee of filing 
deadline for judicial review. West's U.C.A. § 
10-3-1106(6)(a-b). 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €^> 
722.1 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
][ 5AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(C) Proceedings for Review 
15Ak722 Time for Proceedings 
15Ak722.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
The timely filing of petitions of judicial review 
is jurisdictional. 
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A C^> 
723 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(C) Proceedings for Review 
15Ak722 Time for Proceedings 
15Ak723 k. Effect of delay. Most 
Cited Cases 
Failure to timely file a petition for judicial re-
view results in dismissal. 
*878 Ryan B. Hancey, Salt Lake City, for Petition-
er. 
Camille N. Johnson and Maralyn M. English, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondents. 
Before Judges DAVIS, ORME, and VOROS. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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DAVIS, Presiding Judge: 
U 1 Brett Perez contests the decision of the 
South Jordan City Appeal Board (the Board) up-
holding the termination of his employment with 
South Jordan City. We dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion. 
T[ 2 The Utah Municipal Code provides that 
"[a] final action or order of the appeal board may 
be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with 
that court a petition for review," which must "be 
filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final 
action or order of the appeal board." Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a)-(b) (Supp.2011). The de-
cision of the Board in this case was dated June 7, 
2010, and states, "The Board requests the City Re-
corder certify this decision in accordance with the 
South Jordan City Employee Handbook." See gen-
erally id. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(I) ("Each decision of 
the appeal board ... shall be certified to the recorder 
within 15 days from the date the matter is referred 
to it...."); City of South Jordan Employee Hand-
book § 4-06(5)(e)(2), available at http:// sjc. Utah, 
gov/ pdf/ HR- Employee Handbook, pdf (same). 
The City Recorder received the decision on June 
10, 2010, and immediately mailed it to Perez with 
an accompanying letter notifying him that he could 
seek appellate review by filing "a notice of appeal 
no later than 30 days from the date of the issuance 
of the final action or order of the [B]oard." Perez 
filed a petition for review in this court on July 9, 
2010. 
[1] K 3 Perez contends that his petition for re-
view was timely filed in this court because the time 
for appeal did not begin until the decision was cer-
tified to the City Recorder. Respondents, South 
Jordan City and the Board, maintain that the de-
cision was issued as of the date of the order and 
that Perez's petition for review was due no later 
than July 7, 2010. We agree with Respondents. 
f 4 We have previously stressed the importance 
of establishing clear deadlines for appeals, a policy 
that is advanced by measuring filing deadlines from 
the date a decision is issued rather than the date it is 
mailed. See Silva v. Department of Emp't Sec, 786 
P.2d 246, 247 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (mem.) (per 
curiam) (rejecting a proposed rule that "would 
render uncertain the time for appeal in virtually 
every case"). Perez attempts to distinguish his case 
by asserting that the decision of the Board could 
not be considered "issued" until it was certified to 
the City Recorder. However, in construing the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act our supreme court 
has held "that the date the order constituting the fi-
nal agency action issues is the date the order bears 
on its face." Dusty's, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per curi-
am) (construing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) 
(1989) (current version at id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a) 
(2008))). We see no reason to interpret the Utah 
Municipal Code any differently. 
*879 f 5 While the Utah Municipal Code states 
that the Board's decision "shall be certified to the 
recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is 
referred to it," see Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1106(5)(a)(I), this requirement merely 
provides a deadline for the Board to certify its de-
cision to the recorder; it does not add an additional 
requirement for issuance to be complete. Like the 
mailing of an order, which we have held on several 
occasions does not extend the time for filing a peti-
tion for review, see Bonded Bicycle Couriers v. De-
partment of Emp't Sec, 844 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992) (per curiam); Silva, 786 P.2d at 247; 
see also Dusty's, 842 P.2d at 870, the certification 
of the order to the City Recorder is merely a step in 
the process of notifying the petitioner of the 
Board's decision. It does nothing to delay the date 
of issuance. 
| 6 Perez argues that this interpretation results 
in a violation of his right to seek judicial review be-
cause he had no access to the Board's decision until 
after it was mailed to him by the City Recorder. He 
argues that "[i]f the time between execution and 
certification of a decision applies toward the time 
for appeal, nothing would prevent an appeal board 
from holding a decision for twenty-nine days, giv-
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ing a potential appellant just one day in which to 
timely appeal." We agree with Perez that a lengthy 
delay could conceivably result in the violation of a 
petitioner's statutory right to seek judicial review 
and observe that a delay of any more than fifteen 
days would violate the plain language of section 
10-3-1106(5)(a)(I). However, a violation of the pe-
titioner's right to statutory review does not automat-
ically follow every time there is a gap of any length 
between the issuance of the decision and its certi-
fication and mailing. Cf. Buczynski v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 917 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1996) (holding 
that where a decision of the Industrial Commission 
was not mailed until after the time for filing a peti-
tion for review had passed and petitioner's counsel 
promptly filed the petition upon receiving notice of 
the order, petitioner's statutory right to judicial re-
view could not be denied based on the expiration of 
the thirty-day period). The City Recorder's mailing 
of the decision within three days of its issuance was 
sufficiently prompt and did not result in a violation 
of Perez's statutory right to seek judicial review of 
the decision. 
f 7 We are also not persuaded by Perez's argu-
ment that the City Recorder's letter could have reas-
onably misled him into believing that the time for 
filing a petition for review commenced as of the 
date of the letter rather than the date of the order. 
The decision, a copy of which was enclosed with 
the letter, was clearly dated June 7, 2010. The City 
Recorder's letter states that a copy of the decision 
"was delivered to [the City Recorder's] office ... 
June 10, 2010," but then goes on to explain that a 
notice of appeal must be filed "no later than 30 
days from the date of the issuance of the final ac-
tion or order of the board." (Internal quotation 
marks and additional emphasis omitted); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b). Nothing in the 
letter equates the date of issuance with the date of 
delivery to the City Recorder. It was not reasonable 
for Perez to simply assume that he could rely on the 
date of the letter rather than the date of the order in 
calculating the time for filing a petition for review. 
Furthermore, we disagree with Perez that the City 
Recorder had any obligation to point out "the time 
lag between the date of the order and date of its cer-
tification" or to "advise Perez that his appeal win-
dow [was] less than 30 days due to such delay." 
[2] [3] f 8 Because the thirty-day time period 
for filing a petition for review of the Board's de-
cision commenced as of the date of the order—June 
7, 2010—Perez's petition for review, filed on July 
9, 2010, was untimely. "[T]he timely filing of peti-
tions of review ... is jurisdictional," Leonczynski v. 
Board of Review, 713 P.2d 706, 706-07 (Utah 
1985) (mem.), "and failure to timely file results in 
dismissal," Blauer v. Department of Workforce 
Servs., 2007 UT App 280, % 7, 167 P.3d 1102. See 
also Silva, 786 P.2d at 247. Accordingly, we dis-
miss this case. See generally Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. 
Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989) 
("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it 
*880 retains only the authority to dismiss the ac-
tion."). 
H 9 I CONCUR: J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., Judge. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
1[ 10 I dissent. Unlike the majority, I do see a 
reason to interpret the Utah Municipal Code (the 
UMC) differently from the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA). UAPA does not include a 
provision like the UMC provision that imposes a 
certification step. I think the UMC's requirement 
that the decision be certified to the City Recorder is 
analogous to the requirement that judgments be 
filed with the court clerk before they become final 
and appealable. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b)-(c) 
(explaining that a "judgment is complete and shall 
be deemed entered for all purposes ... when it is 
signed [by the judge] and filed [with the clerk]") 
(emphasis added); Willden Family Dental, Inc. v. 
Cannon, 2007 UT App 404U, para. 3, 2007 WL 
4443005 (mem.) (per curiam) (holding that "[e]ntry 
of a final, appealable judgment ... occurred when 
the order granting summary judgment was both 
signed by the district court judge and filed with the 
clerk"). 
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TI 11 If a judge signs a judgment on June 7, but 
it is not filed by the court clerk until June 10, the 
judgment is effective on June 10. See Willden Fam-
ily Dental, Inc., 2007 UT App 404U, para. 4, 2007 
WL 4443005. The Board in this case may have 
signed its decision on June 7, but the statutorily re-
quired certification to the city recorder could not 
have happened until June 10, the day the City Re-
corder indicated in her transmittal letter to Perez 
that the decision was delivered to her and the day 
on which she mailed what she characterized as "a 
copy of the official Certified Decision & Order" to 
Perez. 
FN1. The majority takes comfort in a per 
curiam memorandum decision, Silva v. De-
partment of Employment Security, 786 
P.2d 246 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Unlike the 
petitioner in Silva, however, Perez is not 
claiming that the fact his copy was mailed 
on June 10, but did not reach him until 
later, means his appeal time was extended. 
See id. at 247. Instead, Perez focuses his 
attention on certification, which is much 
more analogous to a clerk filing a court's 
final order than it is to mailing notice of an 
immediately effective decision. In Silva, 
we were apparently concerned about the 
uncertainty that would ensue if petitioners 
used the date on which a decision was 
mailed or on which they received a de-
cision in the mail as the starting date for 
appeal and judicial review deadlines, and 
we held that the starting date has to be 
"when the final agency order issues and 
not when [it is] allegedly received by a 
party." Id. In line with Silva, Perez ac-
knowledges his appeal time started to run 
on June 10, with certification to the city re-
corder, not at some later date when he re-
ceived the decision. 
If 12 Decision "issuance" under the UMC did 
not ripen until the decision was certified to the City 
Recorder, as required by the mandatory language of 
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) (Supp.2011). The uncertainty 
my colleagues worry about is simply not presented 
by this case. Holding to my view—that issuance 
equates to the date a signed order is certi-
fied—promotes just as much certainty as the major-
ity's view that issuance equates to the date of sign-
ing by the Board. And my view recognizes, as 
did the Board, the importance of statutorily man-
dated certification. FN3 
FN2. It may actually be that my view pro-
motes greater certainty. In this case, there 
was a blank for the day in June when the 
order was signed. Someone—one of the 
three signatories, presumably—penned in 
"7." It is admittedly a legible, distinct sev-
en in this case. But what if it looked like it 
could be a one or a seven? Or what if the 
signatories neglected to fill in the blank? 
Or what if the copy mailed to Perez bore 
one hand-written date and the copy in the 
Board's file bore a different one? The un-
certainty resulting from such ambiguity 
would be eliminated by reliance on the 
more straightforward certification date. 
FN3. The Board's decision ends with the 
request that "the City Recorder certify this 
decision." And, as noted, the recorder also 
appreciated the importance of this step, 
taking pains in her transmittal letter to 
refer to the copy enclosed for Perez as "a 
copy of the official Certified Decision & 
Order." 
Utah App.,2011. 
Perez v. South Jordan City 
268 P.3d 877, 697 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2011 UT 
App 430 
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SOUTH JORDAN CITY BOARD OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: Termination of Brett Perez 
DECISION AND ORDER 
INTRODUCTION 
On the date of May 26-27,2010, the above entitled matter came before the South 
Jordan City Appeals Board ("Board") for a hearing to review a decision issued by the South 
Jordan City Police Chief Lindsay Shepherd ("Chief Shepherd") to tenninate Officer Brett Perez 
("Officer Perez"), Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate Officer Perez followed a pre-
disciplinary hearing which was conducted by Chief Shepherd on the date of November 4,2009 
pursuant to the South Jordan City Employee Handbook § 4-06 (4), Chief Shepherd's decision to 
terminate Officer Perez was issued on the date of NovemI>er 12,2009, for an incident which 
occurred on the date of May 28,2009, wherein Officer Perez was found by the South Jordan 
Police Department to have engaged in a high speed police pursuit in a manner which violated the 
South Jordan Police Department and Policy and Procedures Manual, Chapter 26.1,1 Regulation 7 
- Unsatisfactory Performance; and Chapter 26.1.1 Code of Conduct Regulation 42 -
Performance of Duty. Officer Perez appealed Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate him. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There are two basic issues for the Board to consider when reviewing a decision to 
discipline or terminate an employee: 1) whether sufficient evidence exists to support the 
allegation of employee misconduct; and 2) whether the discipline imposed is appropriate, or 
proportionate to the severity of the misconduct. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 10-3-1106 (7) (a), 
"the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the 
governing body of each municipality by ordinance." Under the South Jordan City Employee 
Handbook, § 4*06 (5) d. 5), the standard of review to be applied in this case "is a preponderance 
of the evidence," Thus the Board applies the "preponderance of the evidence" standard to the 
question of whether the allegations described in Chief Shepherd's November 12,2009 
termination letter are supported by sufficient evidence. 
%Ttah law has provided little guidance on the precise factors used to balance the 
proportionality of the punishment to the offense/5 Ogden City Corp, v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 
274, P18 (Utah a . App. 2005) In the Ogden City case, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed a 
decision by the Ogden Civil Service Commission to not terminate a firefighter, who was 
investigated by the Ogden City Fire Department for sundry acts of misconduct The variety of 
instances where misconduct was found to have occurred led the Utah Court of Appeals to 
remand this case to the Ogden Civil Service Commission, with direction to evaluate more closely 
whether the misconduct warranted termination. Id. At PI 5. ' 
The statue which governs Ogden Civil Service Commission (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1012) differs from the operative statute which governs the Board (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106). 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, the principles established in the Ogden City case for evaluating the proportionality of 
punishment to misconduct also guide the Board's review of v&ether Chief Shepherd's decision 
to terminate Officer Perez is proportionate to his misconduct These principles include: 
[A]n exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the 
balance against terminatiocL On the other hand, dishonesty, or a series of 
violations accompanied by apparently ineffectiive progressive discipline may 
support termination. .,. Other courts have given weight to considerations of (a) 
whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties and 
significantly impedes his or her ability to cany out those duties; (b) whether the 
offense was of a type that adversely affects the public confidence in the 
department; (c) whether the offense undermines the morale and effectiveness of 
the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed willfully or knowingly, 
rather than negligently or inadvertently. See 5 i^ ntieau on Local Gov't Law, § 
79.11[4], [5] (2002); Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 
12.237 (3d ed. 1999); 15A Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service §§ 50, 65 (2000). Courts 
have further considered whether the misconduct is likely to reoccur. See Skelly v. 
State Pers. Bd., 15 CaL 3d 194,124 CaL Rptr, 14> 539P.2d 774,791 (CaL 1975). 
Ogden City, 2005 UT App 274, PI 8, After evaluating the fads of this case to determine 
whether termination of Officer Perez is proportionate to the severity of his misconduct, 
the Board may reverse Chief Shepherd' s choice of discipline as unduly excessive "only 
when the punishment is "clearly disproportionate" to the offense,... and "exceeds the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'7" Ogden City, 2005 UT App 274, P17 (Utah 
Ct App. 2005) [Quoting: In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d at 1363]. 
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE RECEIVED BY SOUTH JORDAN CITY 
APPEALS BOARD 
On the Date of May 26,2010, the Board received into evidence: 1) a booklet of exhibits 
submitted by Officer Perez, Nos. 1-20; 2) a booklet of exiiibits submitted by South Jordan City, 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Nos. 1-17, and video recordings from events which involved Officer Perez on the dates of April 
1,2008 and May 28,2009* The Board has also heard Testimony from Officer Perez, Sergeant 
Whitaker,Chief Shepherd, City Manager John Geilmann, and Ryan Loose. Having considered 
the evidence received on May 26,2010, and having considered introductory statements and the 
arguments of the parties, the Board hereby finds the following facts, by a preponderance of the 
evidence; 
ggVDINGS[OF FACT RELEVANT TO MISCONDUCT ON MAY 28,2009, 
L Officer Perez was on duty as a patrol officer for the South Jordan Police 
Department during the early morning hours of May 28,2009. At approximately 0130 hours 
Officer Perez hears sergeant Crist report over the police radio that he has identified a suspicious 
vehicle at the Family Motor Sports business in the Wal Mart Complex, South Jordan, Utah, 
Soon after identifying the suspicious vehicle, Sergeant Crist reports the vehicle has sped away 
from its initial location with its headlights turned off. The vehicle was last seen driving east on 
9800 South at 3200 West 
2. Officer Perez responded to this report by driving to the location of 9800 South 
2700 West Officer Perez' vehicle was facing west on 9800 South Street at this location. By the 
time he reached this location, Officer Perez was advised by Sergeant Crist that the vehicle's 
description was a dark green SUV. 
3, Officer Perez soon identified a vehicle traveling eastbound toward him. on 9800 
South. Officer Perez initiated his emergency equipment and drove toward the suspect to initiate 
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a traffic stop, but the vehicle continued to drive past Officer Perez and tamed northbound on 
27GGWest 
4* Officer Perez pursued the suspect for a limited distance on 2700 West, but 
terminated pursuit upon determining the vehicle would not stop in response to Officer Perez' 
pursuit. As Officer Perez disengaged the pursuit, Officer Perez noticed the vehicle turn east into 
a neighborhood at approximately 9400 South, This neighborhood is accessible only from 2700 
West, Because Officer Perez determined the suspect vehicle would need to come back to 2700 
West in order to escape the area, Officer Perez drove to the location of 9435 South 2700 West. 
Once at this location, Officer Perez again identified the suspect vehicle attempting to leave the 
area, but in reaction to Officer Perez5 arrival, the suspect drove the vehicle in reverse on 9435 
South and attempted to conceal himself in a cul de sac at 2625 West, 
5. Officer Perez entered the cul de sac and soon identified the suspect vehicle parked 
in a yard with its lights turned off Officer Perez exited Ids patrol vehicle with weapon drawn 
and ordered the suspect driver to stop. The suspect driver then activated his headlights and drove 
toward Officer Perez; however, the vehicle soon changed, direction southward, drove to the end 
of the cul de sac, and began to turn around. Officer Nichols arrived in his patrol vehicle at this 
time. 
6. Officer Perez waived Officer Nichols past him to enable pursuit of the suspect. 
As Officer Nichols drove in the direction of the end of the cul de sac, Officer Perez positioned 
himself in the road in an effort to block the suspect's escape. Officer Nichols was not successful 
in stopping the suspect vehicle in the cul de sac, and the suspect vehicle returned in the direction 
of Officer Perez. While standing in the approaching vehicle's pathway, Officer Perez pointed his 
duty weapon at the approaching vehicle, but the vehicle did not stop. Rather, the suspect vehicle 
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drove directly at Officer Perez as he stood in the roadway at 2625 West. Officer Perez was 
forced to jump out of the way of the suspect vehicle to avoid being struck. 
7. The suspect vehicle headed westbound on 9435 South, a residential street, 
through 2700 West and continued westbound until the suspect vehicle reached 3200 West, 
whereupon the suspect vehicle headed north. During this time, Officer Nichols remained in 
close pursuit of the vehicle, and periodically called out the suspect's location. As the suspect 
vehicle escaped the area of the cul de sac at 2625 West, Officer Perez returned to his patrol 
vehicle and attempted to rejoin Officer Nichols' pursuit However, Officer Perez stated that he 
could not immediately rejoin Officer Nichols in his pursuit of the suspect vehicle because by the 
time he was again operating his patrol vehicle, the suspect vehicle has nearly reached 3200 West 
on 9435 south. Officer Perez elected to not follow the suspect vehicle on 9435 South, and 
instead heads northbound on 2700 West, in case the suspect vehicle changes direction to the east 
again. 
8; In order to keep pace with the pursuit of the suspect vehicle, Officer Perez attains 
speeds of up to 70 miles per hour. The speed limit for this area is 35 miles per hour. 
9. While travelling North on 2700 West, Officer Perez does not activate Ms 
emergency equipment Officer Perez' failure to activate this equipment in effect keeps his 
dashboard video camera from activating as well. 
10, As Officer Perez pursues the suspect vehicle by heading north on 2700 West 
Officer Nichols continues his pursuit of the suspect vehicle to a residential neighborhood to the 
northeast of the intersection at 7000 South 3200 west During this pursuit, the suspect vehicle 
loops back south in the direction of 7800 South, again driving on 3200 West, During this time, 
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Officer Nichols would frequently call out the location and direction of travel of the suspect 
vehicle. 
11. Officer Perez monitors Officer Nichols5 description of his pursuit and eventually 
decides to head west on7800 South, from 2700 West, Of Beer Perez stops his patrol vehicle 
when he is approximately half-way between 2700 West and 3200 West Streets. Coincidentally, 
the suspect vehicle opts to head east on 7800 South from 3200 West? straight in the direction of 
Officer Perez. Officer Perez spots the approaching suspect vehicle, activates his overhead 
emergency lights and positions his vehicle in the middle erf 7800 South Street. The suspect 
vehicle disregards Officer Perez7 vehicle and continues east on 7800 South Street Officer Perez 
neglects to activate his siren at the time he activates his emergency lights. 
12. Officer Perez reverses the direction of his vehicle as the suspect vehicle continues 
. eastbound on 7800 South Street. Officer Nichols remains close behind the suspect vehicle in his 
pursuit of the same. The suspect vehicle enters the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West and 
turns north as Officer Perez pursues the suspect vehicle, behind Officer Nichols, and turns north 
in this intersection as well. Officer Perez emergency siren remains off as he proceeds through 
this intersection, 
13. By operation of the traffic control devices at this intersection, Officer Perez did 
not have the right of way to enter the intersection. Thus, immediately before Officer Perez enters 
the intersection, a vehicle headed northbound on 2700 West travels through the intersection and 
immediately pulls over to allow Officer Perez through on 2700 West, No other vehicles entered 
the intersection at 2700 West 7800 South as Officer Perez proceeded through the same. Officer 
Perez initiated his siren sometime shortly after proceeding through the intersection. 
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14. Further description of the facts leading to the termination of Officer Perez' pursuit 
is not warranted. From testimony offered by Chief Shepherd, South Jordan City has represented 
that after Officer Perez proceeded through the intersection at 2700 West 7800 South and 
activated all emergency equipment, specifically his emergency siren, all subsequent actions 
taken by Officer Perez complied with South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy and Utah Law. 
ANALYSIS 
L Sufficient Evidence Exists to support the allegation that Officer Perez violated the 
South Jordan Police Department Policy and Procedures Manual, Chapter 26,1.1 
Code of Conduct Regulation 7 ~ Unsatisfactory Performance, and Chapter 26,1.1 
Code of Conduct Regulation 42 - Performance of Duty. 
As Officer Perez operated his police patrol vehicle from the intersection of 9435 South 
2700 West and to the point where he proceeds through the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West, 
Officer Perez violated The South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy and Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6a-212 in several respects. While testifying before the Board, Officer Perez admitted that his 
failure to activate a siren while turning left at the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West was a 
violation of policy. Specifically, we find Officer Perez failure to initiate a siren before entering 
this intersection constituted a neglectful oversight, which resulted in a violation of Regulation 42 
under Chapter 26, LL of the South Jordan Police Department's Policy and Procedure Manual. 
Therefore, the Board will not discuss this violation further here, but in context of whether the 
decision to terminate Officer Perez is proportionate to his policy violations (below). 
Officer Perez disputed whether his act of speeding northbound on 2700 West violated 
City Policy or the Traffic Code. This issue is related to the question of whether Officer Perez' 
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act of speeding required him to activate emergency .equipment while doing so. Therefore, this 
activity will be fully discussed in this Section. 
The Board has determined that Officer Perez failed to initiate either emergency overhead 
lights or siren while traveling northbound on 2700 West (from 9435 South), and this failure 
facially violates the Traffic Code. During this leg of Officer Perez' pursuit, he operated his 
patrol vehicle at speeds of over 70 miles per hour. The posted speed limit for 2700 West is 35 
miles per hour. 
The Board notes that at the time Officer Perez was traveling northbound on 2700 west, 
from 9435 South, Officer Perez could have lawfully exceeded the speed limit under the Traffic 
Code. Utah Code Ann.§ 41~6a-212 (2) states, "The opersitor of an authorized emergency vehicle 
may .... (c) exceed the maximum speed limits, unless proliibited by a local highway authority 
under Section 41~6a~2G8," However, this statute does not give officers unbridled discretion to 
exceed the speed limit An officer's authority to exceed a, posted speed limit is limited to 
specific instances of law enforcement activity. In the present case. Officer Perez was authorized 
to exceed maximum speed limits because he was "hi the pursuit of an actual or suspected 
violator of the law." Utah Code Ann. § 41~6a~212 (2) (b> 
While Officer Perez was authorized to exceed the .speed.limit under Utah law, he was 
also required under the statute to undertake specific measures to protect the safety of the public 
while in pursuit of the suspect Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6a-212 (4) allows an officer in pursuit to 
exceed the speed limit "only when: (a) the operator of the vehicle: (i) Sounds and audible signal 
under Section 41 -6a-1625; and (it) uses a visual signal with emergency lights ..." Emphasis 
added. The Board finds that: 1) officer Perez was in pursuit of the suspect vehicle when he was 
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speeding northbound on 2700 West Street; and 2) during this pursuit, he failed to comply with § 
41~6a~212 (4) when he failed to initiate traffic lights or a siren, 
Before reaching this conclusion, the Board carefully considered Officer Perez5 argument 
that he was not required to initiate emergency equipment during this segment of events on May 
28,2009. Officer Perez asserts that he was not required to initiate any emergency equipment as 
he proceeded northbound on 2700 West at a speed of 70 miles per hour. Officer Perez5 argues 
that he was not engaged in a pursuit at the time he exceeded the speed limit. His argument is 
based in part on his belief that his proximity to the suspect was too remote to be fairly considered 
a pursuit under Utah law. Therefore, Officer Perez asserts his driving in excess of the speed 
limit to catch a distant suspect is better characterized as "normal patrolling activities with the 
purpose of identifying and apprehending violators,3' Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-212 (3) (b). If 
Officer Perez' interpretation of the Traffic Code is correct, then he has not violated the Traffic 
Code because he "may exceed the speed limit when engaged in normal patrolling activities with 
the purpose of identifying and apprehending violators." Id, 
The Board believes that acceptance of Officer Perez' interpretation of the traffic code 
would create an exception under Utah Code Ann. § 4.1-6a-212 (3) (b), which swallows the rule 
under § 41~6a~212 (4). It is important to note that by the time Officer Perez is proceeding 
northbound, the Suspect Vehicle has come dangerously close to running over Officer Perez, 
This event created probable cause that the suspect had committed a forcible felony under Utah 
law. Therefore, Officer Perez5 response to this event is well beyond the ken of "normal 
patrolling activities* contemplated under § 41-6a-212 (4). If Officer Perez* interpretation of the 
traffic code is correct, then the Board cannot fathom when a pursuit could ever occur, as opposed 
to a "normal patrolling activity." 
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Moreover, if the Board accepted the notion that Officer Perez' was too remote from the 
suspect to be considered "in pursuit," at the time he sped north on 2700 West, then his 
remoteness from the suspect would equally prevent the Board from concluding that his speeding 
was done in the course of formal patrolling activity/' This would lead the Board to conclude 
that there is no basis for Officer Perez to violate traffic lasvs while northbound on 2700 West 
The Board notes that neither of the terms, "in pursuit" nor "norma! patrolling activity" is 
fully defined in the Traffic Code. Therefore, the Traffic Code offers no guidance on when 
proximity of the suspect to a pursuing police officer necessarily ends the pursuit of the suspect, 
or if the suspect's distance from the officer renders the officer's pursuit to be "normal patrolling 
activity.'* However, wre believe the South Jordan City Veldcle Pursuit Policy defines a 
'"Vehicular Pursuit" to include the activities of Officer Perez at the time he sped north on 2700 
West Street 
South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy §41.2.2, Definition No. 21, casts a broad net 
over the sorts of activities which constitute a vehicular pursuit This term is defined to mean "an 
active attempt by a law enforcement officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend 
fleeing suspect(s) who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive tactics." ML The 
Board notes that the proximity of the officer to the suspect is not a factor in determining whether 
an officer's activity constitutes a pursuit Simply put, if an officer's action constitutes "active 
attempt... to apprehend fleeing suspect(s)" then he is in pursuit. Officer Perez testified that 
while speeding northbound on 2700 West, his intended purpose was to apprehend the suspect in 
this case. Therefore, the South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy would hold Officer Perez 
speeding northbound on 2700 south to be a "pursuit" This finding in turn requires Officer Perez 
to activate lights and sirenunder the traffic Code. Failure to do so constituted a facial violation 
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of the Traffic Code, and South Jordan City's vehicle pursuit policy. This violation in turn 
amounts to unsatisfactory performance of his duties under Regulation 7 of the Sough Jordan 
Policy Department Policy and Procedures Manual. 
II. THE SEVERITY OF OFFICER PEREZ' DISCIPLINE -TERMINATION- IS NOT 
DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS CONDUCT ON THE DATE OF MAY 28, 2009, 
WHEN EXAMINED TOGETHER WITH OFFICER PEREZ5 DISCIPLINARY 
RECORD. 
A. Turning Left Through the Intersection of 7800 South 2700 West Without Activating 
An Emergency Siren Was More Significant Than a Mere Technical Violation, 
From the outset, Officer Perez argues that the only clear violation of South Jordan City's 
vehicle pursuit policy occurred when Officer Perez turned left through the intersection of 7800 
South 2700 West without first activating his siren. Officer Perez characterizes this incident as a 
mere technical violation which does not warrant severe discipline. The Board may he inclined to 
agree with Officer Perez' characterization of this event if the Board simply counted the seconds 
from the moment the suspect vehicle drove past officer Perez, to the point where Officer Perez 
activated his emergency siren. The time span which elapsed from the moment Officer Perez 
should have initiated his siren to the moment he did activate the same is not the sole issue to 
consider in weighing the severity of this misconduct. The Board cannot overlook the fact that 
during this brief period of time, Officer Perez' failure to initiate his emergency siren occurred 
when he needed it most: as he proceeded into an intersection when intersecting traffic had the 
right of way. This failure enhanced the degree of danger -posed to the public, and therefore 
cannot be considered a mere technical violation of policy 
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Officer Perez also does not consider this violation as cumulative in relation to his other 
failures to follow South Jordan City's vehicle pursuit policy on the night of May 28, 2009, 
because he did not believe his prior act of speeding without activating emergency lights or siren 
to violate South Jordan vehicle pursuit policy. The Board finds Officer Perez committed not 
one but three separate instances of misconduct during the pursuit of May 28, 2009. Therefore, 
we find these instances to be significant 
B. Disciplinary History. 
In his letter to Officer Perez, dated November 12., 2009, Chief Shepherd notes that 
Officer Perez has been found to violate policy on three separate occasions prior to his violation 
ofpoliciesonthedateof May 28,2009. During the hearing, Chief Shepherd opined that Officer 
Perez* history of misconduct while operating a vehicle shows a pattern of poor judgment, which 
has not improved despite his training. These separate instances of misconduct warrant some 
discussion because they formed apart of Chief Shepherd's basis to terminate Officer Perez5 
employment 
On April 1,2008, Officer Perez willfully engaged m a pursuit of a speeding vehicle. This 
pursuit violated South Jordan vehicle pursuit policy in several respects, including: travelling at 
an excessive speed through at least one intersection when required by policy to stop; 
continuation of pursuit when policy called for Officer Perez to disengage from the same; and 
operation of an unmarked vehicle at speeds of over 100 miles per hour. During the course of this 
pursuit, an accident occurred where three people were severely injured. Two of the three injured 
persons were innocent travelers, who were struck fiom beliind by the vehicle whieh Officer 
Perez had pursued. During the Board hearing of May 26,2010, the facts of this event were 
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fully vetted by the parties; however, the events on this date were not before the Board to consider 
whether Officer Perez" conduct on this occasion violated South Jordan City Department Policies. 
We therefore summarily accept in this Ruling that on April 1,2008, Officer Perez's pursuit of 
another vehicle was conducted in a manner which violated policies and procedures governing 
vehicle pursuits by South Jordan Police Officers. 
Officer Perez' discipline for the events of April 1,2008 included a 30 day suspension 
without pay, and loss of vehicle take home privileges for 60 days. In addition, Officer Perez was 
directed to receive remedial training on department policies relating to vehicle pursuits, and 
further required to develop and conduct departmental in-service training on vehicle pursuit 
policy. 
On July 3,2008, Officer Perez was nearly terminated for a lack of veracity during a 
supervisor's inquiry and subsequent investigation. The facts of this event support the conclusion 
that Officer Perez was not honest with a supervising officer when questioned about whether he 
had taken a vote from officers under his supervision to determine if they favored a proposal to 
change work schedules. In lieu of termination, Officer Perez was demoted from the rank of 
Sergeant to Senior Patrol Officer. Officer Perez was also advised that this evmt would be kept 
permanently in his personnel file, and any further violation of South Jordan City policy would 
result in his termination. 
On May 23,2009, Officer Perez was discovered to have operated his vehicle at an 
excessive speed of 83 miles perhour while responding to a report of a noise complaint The 
nature of this complaint did not warrant breaking speed limits in order to respond. Officer Perez 
was verbally counseled for this incident by his immediate supervisor* It is not known to the 
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Board as to why this incident did not undergo further review, in light of Officer Perez' warning 
that he would be terminated for any other violations of South Jordan City policy. 
While addressing the history of discipline against him, Officer Perez's argument raises 
two separate issues, First, Officer Perez believes termination at this point of his career is 
excessive, because it is the next step on a path of progressive discipline which was built upon an 
excessive punishment imposed for the incident of April 1,2008. Officer Perez believes 
excessive discipline was imposed on this date because that decision rested on improper 
references to prior acts of misconduct which Officer Perez purged from his disciplinary record, 
with approval of the South Jordan Police Department 
In support of this position, Officer Perez offers as evidence a Memorandum to Chief 
Shepherd which documents an occasion on April 24,2005, wherein Officer Perez was found to 
have operated his vehicle at a speed of 73 miles per hour, in excess of the posted speed limit of 
45 miles Per Hour. (See Exhibit No. 11, submitted by Officer Perez.) This incident resulted in 
his pursuit by a patrol officer, and was eventually stopped for-speeding. The memorandum of 
May 17,2005 contains a discussion about another incident which occurred on March 15? 2000, 
wherein Officer Perez was found to be operating a personal vehicle at a rate of speed which 
"drewr the attention" of a traffic officer, and caused him to pursue and stop Officer Perez. (See 
Exhibits 11 and 10, submitted by Officer Perez.) The memorandum of May 17,2005 should not 
have discussed the event of March 15,2000 because documentation of this event was purged 
from Officer Perez personnel file and therefore could not tie used against him in subsequent 
disciplinary proceedings. 
Similarly, Officer Perez5 speeding on April 24 2005 was lightly discussed in a 
Memorandum to Chief Shepherd which recommends discipline for the occasion on April 1., 2008 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
where Officer Perez improperly pursued a vehicle which eventually crashed. (See Exhibit No. 
12, submitted by Officer Perez). Importantly, this memorandum states^ "Sgt. Perez does have a 
disciplinary action that resulted in a 10 day suspension. This action is no longer active in his file 
however it is just short of being two years ago. Due to its Removal it is not clear as to the 
specifics of his past suspension." From this passage, Officer Perez invites the Board to 
conclude that his discipline would have been less severe for the April 1,2008 incident if Exhibit 
No. 12 had contained no improper reference to prior discipline. The Board declines to accept 
this inference fiom the evidence. The board believes that the tenn suspension imposed on 
Officer Perez for his involvement in the pursuit of April 1,2008 was warranted, regardless of 
whether an improper reference to prior misconduct was discussed in a memorandum/to Chief 
Shepherd. 
Moreover* Officer Perez' argument that Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate him is 
tainted by excessive discipline imposed for the occasion of April 1,2008 fails for the simple 
reason that the Board cannot find any evidence the final decision to impose a 30 days suspension 
for the April 1,2008 incident relied on any previous discipline of Officer Perez. Exhibit No, 23 
submitted by South Jordan City, documents the disciplinary action taken against Officer Perez 
for the April 1,2008 incident. This document appears to be some sort of a form document which 
shows a "place-holder" to insert the previous disciplinary record of Officer Perez. Importantly, 
this portion of the document is left blank. Therefore, the Board cannot conclude that the final 
decision to suspend Officer Perez for 30 days relied on any disciplinary history which was 
officially purged. 
Finally, Officer Perez next argues that termination of his employment is excessive, in 
light of the instances where other officers employed by the South Jordan Police Department have 
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operated their assigned vehicles in violation of South Jordan City Policies. Some of these 
instances of misconduct resulted in vehicular accidents,, hut very few of these instances of 
misconduct resulted in severe discipline. In support of this position, Officer Perez submitted a 
summary chart which only generally describes 25 separate instances of improper vehicle 
operation. (See: Exhibit 14? submitted by Officer Perez). The Board identifies that two officers 
received sever discipline on this chart. Officer Phillips received a two day suspension, Officer 
Johnson was terminated, and Officer Barfuss appears to have resigned after his second traffic 
accident resulted in the loss of driving privileges for one year. 
The Board concludes that the information contained in this chart at most suggests Officer 
Perez could have received discipline which is excessive and inconsistent with discipline meted 
out to other officers. However, this chart was submitted without any additional evidence, such as 
testimony folly describing any of the traffic incidents described in Exhibit 14. Standing alone, 
Exhibit 14 does not enable the Board to conclude Perez argument is supported by a 
preponderance of evidence. 
Having found the issues raised by Officer Perez to not support the conclusion that Chief 
Shepherd's decision to terminate him was excessive, fhe Board now applies the guiding 
principles described in the Qgden City (Supra) to the present case. The board concludes that the 
evidence presented to the Board at hearing establishes an example of "dishonesty, [and] a series 
of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline.53 Q&den City, 2005 
UT App 274, PI 8. We therefore believe that the Board caanot conclude Chief Shepherd abused 
his discretion in electing to terminate Officer Perez employment with South Jordan City. 
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The Board hereby concludes the conduct of Officer Perez during the course of a hi$t 
speed pursuit on the date of May 28,2009 violated Regdations 7 and 42 of the South Jordan 
PoEce Department Policy and Procedures Manual, After considering the instances of 
misconduct which occurred on May 28,2009, together with Officer Perez disciplinary history 
from the date of April 1,2008, the Board concludes that Chief Shepherd did not abuse his 
discretion in electing to terminate Officer Perez employment with South Jordan City, Rather, the 
Board concludes that the decision to terminate Officer Perez is well supported by the facts of the 
May 28,2009 pursuit, when in viewed in light of Officer Perez disciplinary history. 
This Decision and Order is approved by the Board following vote by secret ballot which 
occurred on the Date of May 27,2010. The signatures of the Board found on this Decision and 
Order establish the Board's approval of the basis for its decision, without acknowledging the 
vote of any particular Board Member. 
The Board hereby affirms the decision of Chief Shepherd to terminate Officer Perez' 
employment with South Jordan City, The Board requests the City Recorder certify this decision 
in accordance with, the South Jordan City Employee Handbook. 
Dated this 7^ day of June, 2010 
SOUTH JORDAN CTTY RMPTXTYEE APPEAT/BOARD 
0*>etft4 
Board Member 
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* • W. Kent Money, Mayor 
Brian Butters, Council Member 
Kathie L Johnson, Council Member 
Larry Short, Council Member 
Aleta Taylor, CoundA Member 
Leona Winger, Council Member 
John H. Geilmann, Cffy Manager 
June 10,2010 
Ryan B. Hancey 
Scott S. Bridge 
Kesler & Rust 
68 South Main Street, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CarnilleK Johnson 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Re: Employee Appeals Board Certified Decision for Brett Perez v. South Jordan City 
Dear Mr. Hancey & Ms. Johnson, 
Enclosed is a copy of the official Certified Decision & Order of the Employee Appeals Board 
Hearing held May 26,2010 for Brett Perez v. South Jordan City that was delivered to my office 
today, June 10,2010. 
Section 4-06(5)e(4) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states, "any final action or order of 
the hoard may be appealed by either the employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by 
filing with that court a notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date of the issuance of the 
final action or order of the board" 
Sincerely, 
Anna M. West 
City Recorder, CMC 
Cc: Mr. Brett Perez 
John H. Geilmann, City Manager 
L Rob Wall, City Attorney 
South Jordan Employee Appeals Board Members 
1600 WEST TOWNE CENTER DRIVE SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 84095 WWW.SJC.UTAH.GOV 
SOUTH JORDAN 
" U 7 A H 
PH: 801.254.3742 EMAIL- info@sjc.utah.gov FAX: 801,254.3393 
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Westlaw, 
U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1106 Page 1 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code 
* ! Chapter 3. Municipal Government 
* ! Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits 
- • - • § 10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer-
-Appeals—Board—Procedure 
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or involun-
tarily transferred to a position with less remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of departments. 
(2)(a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or involuntarily transferred 
from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection 
(2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the ap-
peal board, established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the employee's 
rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board. 
(3)(a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the municipal 
recorder within 10 days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the final 
disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or invol-
untary transfer. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith refer a copy 
of the appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith commence its 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 10-3-1106 Page 2 i 
investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause 
for the discharge, suspension, or transfer. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5)(a)(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder within 
15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 
days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is discharged or suspended 
without pay; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of less 
remuneration. 
(6)(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with that 
court a petition for review. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or 
order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the purpose of determining 
if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
(7)(a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number of members, the desig-
nation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be 
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prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under Chapter 
3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may 
provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1977, c. 48, § 3; Laws 2004, c. 260, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 19, § 11, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 
2008, c. 115, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008. 
Current through 2011 Third Special Session. 
(C) 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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4-06 EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE 
4-06 (1) General Policy - It is the responsibility of all employees to observe rules 
of conduct necessary for the proper operation of City government. 
Administrative procedures have been established for the handling of 
disciplinary measures when required. 
4-06 (2) Causes for Disciplinary Action - Causes for disciplinary action, up to and 
including termination, may include, but are not limited to the following: 
a. Violation of the laws of the United States, the State of Utah, or 
ordinances of the City of South Jordan or any other jurisdiction 
determined to be job related. 
(1) A conviction (including a plea in abeyance or no contest) 
for the violation of any criminal law shall be prima facie 
evidence in any City hearing process. 
(2) Violation may also be established in any City hearing 
process under an administrative standard of whether the 
evidence shows moire likely than not the violation occurred 
regardless of the pendency or dismissal of criminal charges. 
b. Violation of the code of conduct. 
c. Conduct which endangers the peace and safety of others or poses a 
threat to the public interest. 
d. Any behavior by an employee deemed inappropriate or disruptive 
to the work environment which may affect the ability of other 
employees to perform effectively. 
e. Misconduct. 
f. Malfeasance. (The performance of an act which is legally 
unjustified or conflicts with the law or City-policy). 
g. Misfeasance. (The wrongful performance of a normally lawful 
act.) 
h. Nonfeasance. (The omission of some act which ought to have 
been performed.) 
i. Incompetence. 
j . Negligence. 
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k. Insubordination. 
1. Failure to maintain skills. 
m. Inadequate performance of duties. 
n. Unauthorized or excessive absence or tardiness. 
o. Falsification or unauthorized alteration of records. 
p. Violation of City or department policies. 
q. Falsification of employment application. 
r. Discrimination. 
s. Sexual harassment or prohibited sexual conduct. 
t Retaliation. 
u. Misrepresentation (making false statements or knowingly allowing 
false statements or false impressions to be accepted as valid in the 
course of the employee's job related duties). 
v. Theft or removal of any City property, or the property of any 
employee from the work premises without proper authorization. 
w. Gambling or engaging in a lottery on City property. 
x. Failure of a public safety employee to maintain physical 
fitness/ability standards. 
y. Inability to perform essential job duties, with or without reasonable 
accommodation. 
z. Any other action or behavior contrary to the best interests of the 
City. 
4-06 (3) Types of Disciplinary Action - The following are not written in 
progressive order and are not to be deemed a progressive disciplinary 
scheme or system: 
a. Verbal Warning - A verbally communicated warning to an 
employee by a supervisor for a minor work behavior deficiency. 
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b. Written Reprimand - A formal written notice outlining work 
performance deficiencies and required corrective action, to an 
employee by a supervisor for disciplinary purposes, which is 
documented in the employee's personnel file. 
c. Suspension - An employee may be suspended from work with or 
without pay for up to 30 days (240 hours) by a Department 
Director. For any suspension of more than two day (16 hours), the 
City shall first conduct a pre-disciplinary hearing as outlined in 4-
06 (4), except for appointed, at-will, and probationary employees. 
d. Demotion - An employee may be demoted to a lower grade 
position with or without a reduction in pay by a Department 
Director. If the demotion is also an involuntary transfer to a 
position with less remuneration, the City shall first conduct a pre-
disciplinary hearing as outlined in 4-06 (4), except for appointed, 
at-will, and probationary employees. 
e. Transfer - An employee may be transferred to another position 
within a department by a Department Director. An employee may 
be transferred to another position in a different department within 
the City with approval of the City Manager. If the transfer is an 
involuntary transfer with less remuneration, the City shall first 
conduct a pre-disciplinary hearing as outlined in 4-06 (4), except 
for appointed, at-will, and probationary employees. 
f. Termination - A full-time employee may be terminated by a 
Department Director after consultation with the City Manager or 
designee and the Legal Office. The City shall first conduct a pre-
disciplinary hearing as outlined in 4-06 (4), except for appointed, 
at-will, and probationary employees. All other employees may be 
terminated at the discretion of Department Directors. A hearing is 
not required. 
g. Employees whose conduct constitutes grounds for discipline may 
be subject to one or more of the foregoing disciplinary actions 
depending on the severity of the improper conduct. The City 
reserves the right to impose disciplinary action, up to and including 
termination on a first offense, depending on the nature and severity 
of the improper conduct. 
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4-06 (4) Pre-Disciplinary Hearing - Whenever a full-time employee who is not an 
appointed, at-will, or probationary employee, is subject to possible 
suspension without pay for more than two days (16 hours), demotion or 
involuntary transfer from one position to another with less remuneration, 
or termination, a pre-disciplinary hearing shall be held prior to imposing 
disciplinary action. 
a. The employee shall be given written notice of the hearing, prior to 
the hearing, which will include an explanation of the charges 
against the employee and notice that discipline, up to and including 
termination, will be considered. 
b. The pre-disciplinary hearing shall be conducted by the employee's 
Department Director or designee for the purpose of allowing the 
employee to respond to the charges and present information the 
employee believes is relevant to the decision. 
c. A decision as to the disciplinary action to be taken, if any, shall be 
made by the Department Director or designee, and the employee 
shall be notified in writing within five working days after the 
hearing. This written notification shall include: 
1) The grounds for disciplinary action. 
2) Any disciplinary action to be imposed. 
3) The effective date and duration of the disciplinary action. 
4) Any required corrective action necessary for the employee 
to avoid further disciplinary action. 
5) Notice and a copy of the post-disciplinary hearing process 
outlined in 4-06 (5), if the imposed disciplinary action is 
termination, a suspension of more than two days (16 
hours), or demotion or involuntary transfer from one 
position to another with less remuneration. 
d. Waiver of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing 
An employee may waive the right to a Pre-Disciplinary Hearing. 
Such waiver must be in writing, signed by the employee, and 
specifically acknowledge that the employee has received a copy 
and read the requirements of 4-06, accepts the proposed discipline, 
and acknowledges that the waiver also applies to the right to 
appeal to the Appeal Board. 
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4-06 (5) Appeal Board (10-3-1106, UCA) 
a. A full-time employee, who is not an appointed, at-will, or probationary 
employee, may use the post-disciplinary hearing process. Appeals to the 
Appeal Board shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the 
City Recorder within ten days of receipt of the notice of the imposition of 
the suspension of more than two days (16 hours), demotion or involuntary 
transfer from one position to another with less remuneration, or 
termination, ten days from the receipt of notice by the City Manager or 
designee. 
b. The Appeal Board shall consist of three members. The City 
Manager, at his or her discretion, may appoint his or her self, 
Assistant City Managers, or Department Directors as Appeal 
Board members. 
c. Exhaustion of Internal Grievance Procedures 
The City designates the Appeal Board as the only internal post-
disciplinary appeal procedure for terminations, suspensions 
without pay for more than two days (16 hours), demotions or an 
involuntarily transfer from one position to another with less 
remuneration. 
d. Appeal Hearing Process 
1) The employee shall be entitled to appear in person before 
the Appeals Board and to be represented by counsel (at the 
employee's expense), to have a public hearing, to confront 
the witnesses whose testimony is to be considered, to 
present the employee's own witnesses, to receive and 
present evidence, and to examine the evidence to be 
considered by the Appeals Board. 
2) The Appeals Board determines the admissibility of 
evidence and its use. Further, the Appeals Board is not 
bound by the rules of evidence and may consider any 
evidence it determines relevant to the matter. 
3) The City Recorder records and takes minutes of each 
session, except for the Appeal Board's deliberations. 
4) The City Attorney or designee represents the City's 
interests. 
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5) The standard of review is an administrative standard of 
whether the evidence shows that it is more likely than not 
that the findings and action taken by the Department 
Director are supported. 
6) The Appeals Board may establish hearing procedures 
consistent with 10-3-1106, UCA, and may modify those 
procedures at the hearing as may be equitable and 
conducive to a determination of the issues. 
e. Decision of Appeals Board Hearing 
1) Each decision of the Appeal Board shall be by secret ballot. 
2) Each decision of the Appeals Board shall be certified to the 
City Recorder within 15 days from the date the matter was 
referred to it by the City Recorder; however, upon consent 
of both the employee and the City, the Appeals Board may 
extend the 15 day period to a maximum of 60 days. 
3) In the event the appeals board does not uphold the action of 
the Department Director, the City Recorder shall certify the 
decision to the employee affected, and to the City Manager 
and Department Director. If the Board does not uphold the 
suspension, demotion or termination, the board shall 
provide in its order 
a) the employee shall receive the employee's salary 
for the period of time during which the employee 
was discharged or suspended without pay, 
b) or that the employee be paid any deficiency in 
salary for the period during which the employee 
was demoted or involuntarily transferred to a 
position of less remuneration. 
4) Any final action or order of the Board may be submitted for 
review by either the employee or the City to the Utah Court 
of Appeals by filing a petition for review no later than 30 
days from the date of the issuance of the final action or 
order of the Appeals Board. 
4-06 (6) Requests to Purge Disciplinary Records - An employee may submit a 
written request to have prior disciplinary records purged to the City 
Manager. 
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a. The employee must wait a minimum of two years before a request 
will be considered. Requests will only be considered if there have 
been no intervening disciplinary actions. 
b. The City Manager shall consider the request within 10 working 
days of receipt. 
c. All decisions shall be at the sole discretion of the City Manager or designee. 
Employee Handbook Employee Conduct Section Four 
Effective Date: 6/15/10 4.24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
